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ABSTRACT
Data holders are increasingly seeking to protect their user’s privacy,
whilst still maximizing their ability to produce machine models
with high quality predictions. In this work, we empirically evaluate
various implementations of differential privacy (DP), and measure
their ability to fend off real-world privacy attacks, in addition to
measuring their core goal of providing accurate classifications. We
establish an evaluation framework to ensure each of these imple-
mentations are fairly evaluated. Our selection of DP implementa-
tions add DP noise at different positions within the framework,
either at the point of data collection/release, during updates while
training of the model, or after training by perturbing learned model
parameters. We evaluate each implementation across a range of
privacy budgets, and datasets, each implementation providing the
same mathematical privacy guarantees. By measuring the mod-
els’ resistance to real world attacks of membership and attribute
inference, and their classification accuracy. we determine which im-
plementations provide the most desirable tradeoff between privacy
and utility. We found that the number of classes of a given dataset
is unlikely to influence where the privacy and utility tradeoff oc-
curs. Additionally, in the scenario that high privacy constraints are
required, perturbing input training data does not trade off as much
utility, as compared to noise added later in the ML process.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Advanced machine learning (ML) techniques enable accurate data
analytics for various application domains. This promoted the com-
mercial deployment of ML as a service (offered by data giants, such
as Google and Amazon) which allows data-driven businesses to
train models on sensitive data while offering third party (paid)
access to these models. Although commercially attractive, these
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services can be vulnerable to model theft and privacy infringements
potentially not compliant with developing privacy regulations (e.g.,
EU and USA regulations such as COPPA [7] and GDPR [14], and
most recently e-Privacy [29] and CCPA [5]). In order to preserve
their models’ privacy while still maximizing their ability to produce
ML and deep learning (DL) models that have high utility for their
services, data-driven organizations are turning towards leveraging
privacy-preserving ML (PPML) techniques, building on theoretical
frameworks of Differential Privacy [10, 12] (DP) and/or Federated
Learning [22] (FL). However, differentially private PPML methods
often come with an intrinsic tradeoff between utility (e.g., as cap-
tured by accuracy of the model) and the privacy guarantees offered
by the technique applied to protect user data.
A recent initial investigation in [20] studies different DP compo-
sitions, and how these compositions can be applied to the training
of a neural network or logistic regression model. [20] reports on
the impact these privacy mechanism have on the model’s utility,
and the effectiveness of inference attacks on the resulting models.
Inspired by [20], and towards the goal of understanding the tradeoff
between privacy and utility of DP-enabled ML methods, we dive
deeper into this problem and, in this study, we set to assess how
this inherent tradeoff depends on the (1) ML method used, (2) stage
in the ML framework where the DP method is applied to protect
the data or model, and (3) complexity of training data in use with
respect to classes and attributes in the data.
We develop a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of a
DP-enabled ML framework that enables a privacy ML researcher to
study the Utility-Privacy tradeoff in depth for their data at hand. Our
objective is to allow the selection of the best performing method
yielding the highest predictive accuracy while still ensuring a solid
level of privacy protection, by studying the different stages where
DP-based noise can be applied: as an obfuscation to the input data,
duringmodel training, or at the model finalization by perturbing the
learned model parameters. Equally important, the study’s objective
is to inform privacyML researchers what privacy threshold to apply
in their framework, and what are the privacy guarantees expected
from the selected setup, vs. the utility of the chosen ML method.
We study various recent DP implementations of classical ML
and DL methods such as Naive Bayes, and Neural Networks, and
empirically measure their ability to fend off black-box privacy at-
tacks that may be practically launched in the real-world, while also
measuring the model’s core goal of providing accurate classifica-
tions. Crucially, we establish this standard evaluation framework
to ensure each of these DP implementations are evaluated fairly.
In particular, we study and test how ML performance and pri-
vacy are impacted when DP noise is added at different stages of
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the ML pipeline: Stage (1) by adding noise to the input data before
the ML/DL training phase. Stage (2) where DP noise is added dur-
ing model updates, i.e., while training the selected model. Stage
(3) after the model training is performed, by perturbing learned
model parameters. We evaluate each DP-enabled ML implementa-
tion across a range of privacy budgets, each instance providing the
same mathematical privacy guarantees. We measure different met-
rics to capture the aforementioned tradeoff: privacy offered to the
model and data (resistance to membership and attribute inference
attacks) and model utility (classification accuracy).
We use both synthetic and real-world datasets to capture the
aforementioned privacy and utility tradeoff. Our use of a synthetic
dataset enables us to isolate the effects of DP noise, stages and
dataset complexity without the influence of data distributions. How-
ever, not to discount the importance of standard real-world datasets,
we also perform our evaluation on a range of real data like CI-
FAR [23], Purchase [2], and the Netflix dataset [27] in which we
provide the same pre-processing treatment as Purchase [2].
With our experimentation, we make the following observations.
Most notably, for a given amount of model utility, applying DP
noise at stages later than the input phase permits the addition of
more DP noise, thus providing higher privacy guarantees. This
observation is consistent across all DP-ML algorithms.
When considering utility and privacy as function of the DP noise,
we identify an “inflection point” for each function, an indicator of
where the greatest change in utility and/or privacy will occur for a
given DP-ML method. We find that this point on privacy function
is more closely related to the Utility response, and the DP-ML
method used, instead of DP privacy guarantees, as expected from
the amount ofDP noise applied to the process. Also, data complexity
of the dataset is unlikely to influence the inflection point of the
utility or the privacy function. Finally, when privacy or utility come
with constraints, we provide recommendations for best performing
DP-ML method, and their expected utility and privacy guarantees.
We contribute our open sourced framework1 for reproducibility
purposes, as well as for other researchers to build on it and study
privacy and utility thresholds of newly proposed DP-ML methods.
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Overview
In this Section, we provide details of the building blocks needed to
study the privacy-utility tradeoff as a comprehensive and modular
methodology. Our methodology encompasses the following:
• DP noise definitions (Sec. 2.2)
• Stages of the ML pipeline at which DP noise is added (Sec. 2.3)
• ML algorithms that are DP-enabled (Sec. 2.4)
• Privacy metrics, assessed with privacy attacks on data (Sec. 2.5)
• ML utility metrics (Sec. 2.6)
In this work, we provide an instantiation of this methodology
(Figure 1) to evaluate the privacy-utility tradeoff in DP-enabled ML
algorithms. Next, we cover details for each of these building blocks,
and in Section 3, we provide details of their implementation.
1Source code available at: https://github.com/PrivateUtility/PrivateUtility
Note that our methodology can be extended to account for other
considerations in the privacy-utility tradeoff analysis. This could
include Resource metrics (e.g. required computational resources for
training ML models) or various datasets characteristics in use.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) mathematically defines the protection of-
fered in regards to the privacy of a single data vector, whether that
is representative of an individual, or a single temporal event [10, 11].
The ϵ-differential privacy is defined such that two neighboring sets
of data D and D ′, differing by a single vector are indistinguishable
up to a limit as described by a privacy budget ϵ . The output of a
mechanismM applied on each dataset should also be indistinguish-
able from each other, up to our limit of ϵ . In other words:
Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ Pr [M(D ′) ∈ S] ∗ eϵ (1)
Many differentially private ML algorithms support relaxations of
the DP definition. There are two main relevant relaxations of ϵ-
DP : (ϵ,δ )-DP [12], and (α , ϵ)-DP (Renyi-DP) [24]. Both relaxations
provide eased requirements for DP , while preserving properties
such as composition and core privacy guarantees.
We will not be using these relaxations in this work, however, we
note they are reducible to (ϵ)-DP , the focus definition in this paper.
In fact, (ϵ,δ )-DP [12] is equivalent to (ϵ)-DP , when δ = 0, and (α , ϵ)-
DP [24] is reduced to ϵ-DP when α = inf . Also, the authors in [3],
given a set of assumptions, derive the upper bound of ϵ-differential
privacy as p/ϵ , where p is the dataset dimensionality.
2.3 ML Pipeline Stages for DP Noise Injection
As noted by [20], there are three general positions in which DP
noise can be applied to a ML task, to preserve privacy of the data
used, or the model built. These three positions of entry in the ML
pipeline are visualized in Figure 1. To make the next observations
more concrete, let the function F map the training dataset X to
class labels y, that is, F (X) = y. Then, the goal of the ML model is
to approximately learn this relationship between dataset and labels
as best as possible. Next, we discuss each of these three Stages:
Stage 1 (S1): Before the learning process. During the collection or
release of data (X), and before aggregation at the server, if local DP
noise is applied on every data record, the data (X’) are protected
before being used in a ML pipeline. Alternatively, when releasing a
dataset to the public domain, the owner can train a data generator
to create a synthetic dataset containing the same data semantics as
the real data, but with the synthetic data governed by the rules of
DP . Consequently, the F (X’) model learned is DP-enabled.
Stage 2 (S2): During the learning process. In this stage, each step of
the model update is restricted as to not excessively alter the model
with the added DP noise (F ′(X)), and thus compromise the privacy
of a given batch of records. The classic example for this Stage is
the Tensorflow Privacy, which deploys a DP stochastic gradient
descent algorithm [1].
Stage 3 (S3): After the learning process. After the data modeling has
finished, the learned parameters of the model can be perturbed, by
adding DP noise on them (F ′(X)) to remove dependencies between
learned parameters and training data.
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Figure 1: Our instantiation of the proposed methodology, with the three possible Stages that DP noise can be introduced in
the ML pipeline to guarantee data privacy, and performance metrics used to assess privacy-utility tradeoff.
2.4 DP-based ML Algorithms
A literature review on existing ML methods that provide DP pro-
tection to the data or model revealed that various realizations can
be loosely divided in the three Stages outlined above. We identified
two key ML classification algorithms of interest: Naive Bayes (NB),
and Neural Networks (NN ). Next, we describe the approach used by
each one in learning on data in a supervised setting, while applying
DP noise in each Stage. We remark that [20] focused primarily on
different DP compositions for NN and LR, both leveraging empiri-
cal risk minimization in the learning process, and loosely mapping
to our S2 and S3 Stages, respectively. However, they did not offer
direct comparisons of these ML algorithms across all Stages, as we
do. In fact, we compare these and other DP-based ML methods,
summarized in Table 1, as applicable in each Stage.
Table 1:DP-enabledMLmethods used in eachpipeline Stage.
Stage where DP noise is applied
ML Method S1 S2 S3
Naive Bayes X X
Neural Network X X
2.4.1 S1: Manipulation of Laplacian Noise. At this Stage, we apply
DP Laplacian noise [9] directly on the dataset, and thus, this process
is independent of the ML algorithm used in subsequent steps of the
framework. As a result of this independence, we can employ all four
ML algorithms, in their non-private versions, on the modified, DP
data. In particular, DP is provided by the addition of noise to every
vector in the dataset. Laplacian noise is independently sampled
for every feature value, of every data vector from the distribution
Lap(0, βi ), where βi = Siϵ/p , and Si is the value range of the ith
feature [9] (Algorithm 1).
Input: Training Dataset X , where x := {x0, ...,xi , ...,xp }
Result: Differentially private Training Dataset X ′
for x in X do
x ′ = x + b; where b := {b0, ...,bi , ...,bp };bi ∈ Lap(0, βi )
end
Proceed with learning task F on X ′.
Algorithm 1: Direct addition of DP noise to dataset before ML.
Adding DP noise in S1 is ML independent and permits more
flexibility, as any ML or DL method can be employed after S1 for
training. The application of noise is dependent on data types and
their complexity with respect to features and values allowed.
Remark 1. DP noise is applied with the assumption that features
are independent from each other, meaning a maximal amount of
noise must be applied to each feature to ensure DP. With knowledge
of feature dependence, hypothetically less noise can be applied to the
dependent features as there is less uniquely identifying information
between the dependent features.
2.4.2 S2: DP-based Neural Networks. Neural Networks (NN ) are
designed to mimic the functionality observed within brains [16].
They contain multiple layers of neurons (some hidden) that are acti-
vated depending on the activation of neurons in the previous layer.
The influence of a previous layer’s neurons on the current neuron
varies depending on a weight or parameter value learned during
the training phase. The very final layer is often a decision layer
that corresponds to each of the classes present in the classification
problem. The degree of activation of this last layer is analogous to
the confidence of the class prediction.
The approach employed by Tensorflow-Privacy’s [1] implemen-
tation ofDP-enabledNN involves the use of aDP stochastic gradient
decent (SGD) algorithm. The SGD algorithm seeks to find network
parameters θ to learn function F . The DP-based SGD first clips or
limits the size of gradient update, to not be heavily impacted by
one batch of data. Additional noise is added to the updated gradient
depending on the values of ϵ , and batch sensitivity (Algorithm 2):
Input: Training Dataset X
Result: Differentially private parameters θ ′
θ ′ ← RAND, initialize the parameters randomly;
for batch t ∈ T do
compute gradient ∆θ , clip gradients ∆θ , add DP-noise b
θ ′ = θ ′ + ∆θ + b
end
Complete F ′ learning task with θ ′.
Algorithm 2: DP-based Stochastic Gradient Decent [1].
2.4.3 S3: DP-based Naive Bayes. The Naive Bayes (NB) [30] classi-
fication algorithm learns probabilistic distributions of the output
classes informed by the input feature values. The algorithm is con-
sidered “naive”, as it assumes an independence between features.
The distributions are learned directly from the training dataset. The
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simple formulation of the model enables the Naive Bayes classifiers
to both be trained, and to make predictions relatively quickly.
IBM NB [17] implements an (ϵ)-DP NB, originally by [33]. The
approach adds noise to the learned distributions that relate the input
feature to the output decision. Algorithm 3 shows the Laplacian
noise addition to the mean and standard deviation (µ, σ ) computed
from training dataset X . A more complete algorithm for handling
both categorical and continuous data can be found in [33].
Input: Training Dataset X
Result: Differentially private model distributions θ ′
Compute (µ, σ ) from X ;
for i in f eatures do
Compute scaling factor S(µ,i) and S(σ ,i) from feature mean
µi , feature STD σi , and ϵ ;
µ ′i = µi + bi ; where bi ∈ Lap(0, S(µ,i));
σ ′i = σi + bi ; where bi ∈ Lap(0, S(σ ,i));
end
Compute output priors P(y |x) from (µ ′, σ ′);
Algorithm 3: DP-based Naive Bayes provided by IBM [17].
2.5 Privacy Attacks & Privacy Metrics
Traditionally, privacy has been measured with theoretical metrics
such as information leakage [19, 25] and mutual information [34].
However, recent privacy attacks such as membership inference
(MI) [31, 32, 35] and attribute inference (AI) [35, 37] have been in-
troduced [20] as alternatives to measure privacy risk of ML models.
In this work, we quantify the privacy offered by the implementa-
tion of DP , through the effectiveness of these two well-known pri-
vacy attacks (MI and AI). The threat model adopted by these attacks
falls under the category of black-box attacks, with an adversary
only having access to the input and output of the MLmodel (though
white-box approaches can enhance the attack performance [26]). In
fact, for the current generation of MI attacks [31, 32, 35], only one
query is required for the vector in question (disregarding queries
needed to train an attack model), whereas AI attacks need multiple
queries, one for any possible value in the unknown attribute.
Next, we survey multiple MI and AI attacks. However, in the
experimental part of this work we focus on theMI attack of SalemMI
and the AI attack of YeomAI (see details next).
2.5.1 Membership Inference Attack. MI attack [31, 32, 35] defines
an attacker that tries to determine if a specific data record has been
included within the training data of a given ML model, or not. The
attack objective is related to the definition ofDP , as according toDP ,
two datasets with or without an ϵ proportion of records should be
indistinguishable from each other. Of course, this is problematic if
a privacy ML practitioner is seeking to maintain the confidentiality
of their training data, or to adhere to privacy regulations governing
the data used in training. In literature, there are three realizations
of the MI attack [31, 32, 35].
SalemMI [31] attackworks on the premise that aMLmodel is more
confident about a prediction on an input vector it has previously
encountered (in the training set), than an input vector it has not
previously encountered (in the testing set). Thus, a vector with
a higher prediction confidence on any class label is more likely
to be a member vector. A threshold can be found from a similarly
distributed dataset tomake a final distinction if an input is amember
or non-member. Indeed, this attacker does not know the vector’s
classification truth, and the prediction confidence is a single value of
the most probable class, irrespective of if it is the correct prediction.
YeomMI [35] attack is similar to SalemMI . However, they use pre-
diction loss, requiring the true label of the input vector. Additionally,
instead of finding a threshold from a similar data distribution, the
model training loss is assumed known and used as the threshold.
The additional information needed makes the YeomMI attack more
difficult to mount than SalemMI , but more effective.
ShokriMI [32] Shokri’s MI attack trains shadow models that repli-
cate the behavior of the target model, fromwhich an attack model is
trained to differentiate between members and non-member vectors
from the training and testing process of said shadow models. The
attack model takes as an input, the prediction probabilities of all
classes for a given vector. The shadow models allow an attacker
to produce larger datasets for the attack model, and thus train a
superior attack model. However, the process of training shadow
models is a computation and data intensive operation (Though [31]
demonstrates only one shadow model is required, in addition to an
ability train an attack model on a different dataset and transfer said
attack model to the target model and data).
2.5.2 Attribute Inference Attack. AI attack is an extension of the
MI attack, however, instead of only determining if a record is in-
cluded within the training set, the adversary seeks to recover the
exact value of a missing attribute that could be masked due to it’s
sensitivity (e.g., the diagnosis for type of cancer of an individual).
In particular, if a record vector has a dimensionality of n (i.e., n
features), the adversary is assumed to have n−1 true features of the
original record. Their objective is to infer the nth feature’s sensitive
value. In general, AI attacks are more difficult to mount than MI
attacks due to the requirements on the attacker.
The first method of AI (YeomAI ) follows work by [35] and [20]
in evaluating every binned permutation of a vector and its unknown
attribute, and selecting the value that produces a loss closest to the
model’s training loss. The second attack (SalemAI ) follows work
by [37] and [31], by selecting the vector permutation that produces
the highest model confidence as the most likely real attribute.
To date, many implementations of AI attack (e.g., as in [20])
bin numerical features for a binary evaluation. In this work, we
go beyond the state-of-art and increase the number of allowable
(binned) values in the inference of a vector’s attribute, from two
bins up to a maximum to 10 bins, depending on the unique values
of an attribute. For instance, if an attribute is binary, two bins are
required. A numerical feature with 6 distinct values will require 6
bins, and a continuous feature will be binned into 10 value bins.
2.5.3 Measuring Privacy Leaks: Adversary Advantage. The adver-
sary advantage can be described as the improvement of a privacy
attack observed on a set of input vectors that were included in the
training set, as opposed to not being included in the training set.
The rate at which the privacy attack succeeds on the positive class
(member vectors) is the True Positive Rate (TPR), while the rate
at which privacy attack is incorrectly predicted on the negative
class (non-members) is the False Positive Rate (FPR). As such, the
advantage can be formulated as ADV = TPR − FPR. A rigorous
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definition of the advantage is provided in [35]. It is clear novel
attacks, and their advantage can be added in our framework. Here,
we measure the impact of the four aforementioned attacks.
2.6 ML Utility Metrics
The objective of ML is to learn trends from a training dataset, and
then predict the label of a previously unseen input instance. To
evaluate the effectiveness of a trained model, predictions are made
on a holdout set (not used in training), said predictions are then
compared to known true labels. The proportion of the holdout
set that is correctly re-predicted as the true labels, represents the
accuracy (ACC) of the trained model: ACC = ncorrect /nholdout .
Accuracy is a simple measure of ML prediction performance.
Other commonly usedmetrics are AUC, Precision, Recall, or F-Score.
Also, new metrics such as model fairness [8] and minimization of
computational processes [4, 6] can be important in a privacy-utility
tradeoff. All such utility metrics can be added in our framework.
We focus onAccuracy Loss (ACL), defined as the ratio of perfor-
mance lost whenDP is applied to the ML process (m), in comparison
to an equivalent ML model trained with no DP applied (i.e., ϵ = inf):
Accuracy Loss (ACL) = 1 − ACC(m,ϵ )
ACC(m,ϵ=inf)
(2)
3 EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
In this section, we detail how the methodology introduced earlier
is instantiated2 to experimentally investigate the tradeoff between
ML model performance with respect to prediction, vs. privacy guar-
antees provided to data used to train said model. In particular, with
our experimentation, we are interested in answering questions of:
(1) What is the inflection point in the tradeoff between ML
model accuracy and privacy leak? Is this inflection point
consistent across various types of privacy attacks?
(2) Does the stage of the DP-enabled ML framework in which
the DP noise is applied impact this inflection point?
(3) Is there a ML method that outperforms others at both predic-
tion and privacy guarantees, consistently across datasets?
We seek to empirically identify important parameters that affect
the manifestation of this privacy-utility tradeoff. To this end, in
Sec. 3.1, we detail the experimental procedures that vary the DP
noise amount (ϵ), where it is applied in the framework (Stages), dif-
ferent DP-ML algorithms implemented and metrics used. Then, we
describe the training datasets used, both synthetic and real (Sec. 3.2),
providing details on number of classes and type of attributes (con-
tinuous, binary). In the next Section 4, we present our experimental
results and extract key takeaway messages.
3.1 Experimental Framework
First, we detail implementations of DP-ML methods used, as well
as metrics to assess ML performance and privacy when DP noise
is applied. We note that Sec. 2 already provided details for the pri-
vacy attacks and ML methods used. Then, we outline the common
steps shared between all evaluations of the DP-ML methods. We
bootstrapped our framework implementation from [21], but make
the following crucial extensions:
2We provide our code and data at https://github.com/PrivateUtility/PrivateUtility
• accommodate the new ML algorithms to run in this framework,
• adapt code to improve framework resource consumption,
• add implementation of MI attack proposed by Salem et al. [31],
• adapt AI attack of Yeom et al. [35] to support multiple bin values
instead of only binary,
• add synthetic data generation for tradeoff & benchmark studies.
3.1.1 Machine & Deep Learning Methods. We used implementa-
tions of ML algorithms explained in Sec. 2.4 readily available online.
Tensorflow-Privacy [1] has code in [15]. IBM Naive Bayes [17] has
code in [18]. The hyper-parameters of the NN models were repli-
cated from [20]. All other models’ parameters are kept at library
defaults.
3.1.2 Performance Metrics & Privacy Budget. In our experiments
with the various ML methods and datasets, we measure different
performancemetrics. For prediction performance of a trainedmodel,
we measure Accuracy Loss (ACL) (See Sec. 2.6), We perform two
MI and AI attacks, SalemMI and YeomAI (See Sec. 2.5), to quantify
privacy leaks. Finally, in order to vary the amount of DP noise
applied in each framework Stage and in each ML method, we use
different values for the privacy budget:
ϵ = {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000}.
3.1.3 Experimental Steps. To perform the evaluation for: 1) a given
dataset, on 2) a DP-based ML method, with 3) a privacy budget ϵ ,
we first sample from the dataset two sets of 10,000 samples each,
forming our training and testing sets. Then, we train the ML model
with the training set. In the case of S1 DP noise, we apply noise to
the training set prior to the model training.
Each model’s prediction accuracy is obtained on the unseen test-
ing set. With a trained model, the SalemMI , and YeomAI attacks
are performed. In MI attacks, the training set constitutes the mem-
bership set, whilst the testing set is the non-member test set. In
AI attacks, we consider up to 10 unique values for the unknown
protected attribute (whilst accounting for continuous features). The
attack is repeated on 20 different attributes, randomly selected to be
the protected attribute. Then, the entire training and attack process
is repeated 5 (10) times for synthetic (real) data, with training and
testing sets sampled anew, to reduce impact of biases arising from
the data or DP noise.
3.2 Experimental Datasets
3.2.1 Synthetic Data. We generated data by uniformly sampling
100k vectors from a normalized feature space of 50 features. From
these 100k vectors, we apply k-means clustering onto the dataset
to artificially create labels of 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100 and 200 classes.
This results in 7 different datasets of varying number of classes,
however, they all contain the same vectors originally sampled.
3.2.2 Real-World Data. We used three real datasets to study the
tradeoff in our DP-enabled framework (summary in Table 2):
CIFAR-100 [23]: The CIFAR dataset consists of 50k tiny images of
various objects, that can be labeled according to 100 types. They can
also be re-classified under 20 type super-classes. This dataset has
been pre-processed with principal component analysis as in [20],
to extract 50 key features to represent each of the images.
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Table 2: Summary of datasets used in our experimental in-
vestigation, with respect to number of instances available,
classes provided (or constructed), and attributes available.
Dataset Instances Classes Attributes
Synthetic 100,000 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200 50
CIFAR [23] 50,000 20, 100 50
Purchase [2] 200,000 2, 10, 20, 50, 100 599
Netflix [27] 100,000 2, 10, 20, 50, 100 1000
Purchase [2]: The Purchase dataset contains 200k user records of
item purchases made from a set of 599 products. The values are
binary, indicating if users had or not bought one of the 599 items.
We perform a similar pre-processing step as in [32], by encoding of
a single user’s transaction history as a binary vector, followed by
the k-means clustering of users into purchaser groups. We consider
label complexities of k = {2, 10, 20, 50, 100}.
Netflix Prize [27]: The Netflix dataset was first released in 2006,
and contains ratings (from 1 to 5) by viewers on the Netflix plat-
form for movies they watched. This dataset was also used in [35].
However, insufficient pre-processing details were provided for us to
replicate their exact dataset. Therefore, we performed the following
steps: (1) Sample the user ratings of the top 1000 rated (based on
number of ratings, not rating score) movies within the dataset. (2)
Every user has its ratings assembled into a feature vector, with
unrated movies filled in with a zero value. (3) If a user has not rated
any of the 1000 most popular movies, the user is excluded from the
dataset. (4) Then, we apply k-means clustering (as in Purchase) to
obtain viewer groupings of k = {2, 10, 20, 50, 100}.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our results for different experiments
using our evaluation framework, to answer the questions posed in
Sec. 3. We first analyze results with synthetic data, while control-
ling class complexity, and extract generalized patterns related to
the privacy-utility tradeoff. We shall compare these patterns with
results on real data to assess how the tradeoff manifests on the
real-world datasets.
4.1 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff on Synthetic Data
We perform experiments on controlled, synthetic datasets to dis-
cover generalizable properties that can be drawn regarding the
privacy-utility tradeoff. The synthetic dataset allows us to remove
the effect of data-specific biases (in a controlled manner), that may
otherwise be present in the real data.
4.1.1 ML accuracy vs. DP noise. In Figure 2, we analyze ACL and
its inflection point for the different ML algorithms, while varying
class complexity, amount of DP noise and the stage at which it is
applied. When applying large amounts of DP noise (i.e., small ϵ)
at the input Stage (Stage 1), we observe that the ACL is equivalent
to a random guess irrespective of the ML algorithm in use. It is
not until ϵ=10 for NB and ∼100 for NN that the ML algorithm is
capable of outperforming a random guess. In Stage 2, NN exhibits
a notable inflection point at ϵ=10. Finally, at Stage 3, the inflection
point for NB occurs at ϵ=0.01. When we compare ML performance
across Stages, we observe that from S1 to S3, there is an increasing
amount of DP noise that can be applied to the ML method, before
the accuracy of the system is reduced to a random guess.
Notably, given that the synthetic dataset is generated with the
same underlying data vectors but with different class complexities,
we observe that the inflection point occurs at about the same value
of ϵ , irrespective of the number of classes.
While this inflection point does not vary across class complex-
ities, the complexity of each dataset has a direct impact on the
maximum ACL (due to the random guess).
4.1.2 Membership Inference Attacks vs. DP noise. In Figure 3, we
analyze the results on SalemMI attack. We first analyze the inflec-
tion point of the privacy advantage of the attacker, for each of the
framework stages, followed by an analysis on the class complexity.
Across all ML methods in Stage 1, there is a clear inflection point
at ϵ=100, where an attacker until this point has a privacy advantage
on vectors within the training data. It is interesting to note that in
comparison to the ACL, the SalemMI advantage reaches zero before
the accuracy is completely diminished. In Stage 2, the absolute
advantage is rather small, resulting in a seemingly high variance.
Finally, in Stage 3, the inflection point for NB occurs at ϵ=1∼10. We
note that the gradient of decreasing SalemMI advantage (i.e., while
ϵ is decreasing), is similar between S1 and S3, while the inflection
points in S3 occur at smaller ϵ values than S1.
Across Stages, we note that for ML methods in S2, the SalemMI
struggles with very low advantages, in comparison to S1 and S3.
Similar to what was observed in ACL, the class complexity appears
to have little effect on the inflection point of the SalemMI attack.
However, where the attack is effective, a higher class complexity is
more vulnerable to SalemMI attack.
4.1.3 Attribute Inference Attacks vs. DP noise. In Figure 4, we an-
alyze the results on YeomAI attack. We study the inflection point
of the attack for each stage and across stages, and across class
complexity.
Across S1, there is an inflection point in the attack effectiveness at
ϵ=10∼100. We note that the absolute advantage of the attack differs
depending on the ML algorithm used. For S2, the NN inflection
occurs at ϵ≈100. Lastly, for S3, NB has inflection point at ϵ=0.1.
The peak of the Yeom AI attack does not appear to perform well
on S2:NN relative to the other ML methods, however it is noted
that the ACL for this model did not approach zero like the other
3 models as previously seen in Figure 2, though for NB between
S1 and S3, the absolute AI advantage remains relatively similar.
However, adding noise at stage S3 seems to have a bigger impact
on the inflection points of NB than when adding noise at Stage S1.
Again, we observe that number of classes does not impact the
position of the inflection point for a given DP ML technique.
4.1.4 Summary of Results on Synthetic Data. We saw evidence of
a measurable inflection point and the tradeoff between the utility
and privacy, as measured by MI and AI attacks. The observable ϵ
value in which this inflection occurs, is largely dependent on the
Stage in which the DP noise is applied, and to a lesser extent on the
algorithm used. Between ACL and privacy advantage results, class
complexity has little impact on where the tradeoff is observed.
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Figure 2: Accuracy Loss for each ML method used, when different amount of DP noise is applied at framework Stages 1, 2 or
3, and for synthetic dataset complexities used. The underlying complexity of data vectors in each dataset remains the same.
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Figure 3: Advantage of SalemMI attack for each ML method, when different amount of DP noise is applied at Stages 1, 2 or 3,
and for different synthetic dataset complexities. The underlying complexity of data vectors in each dataset remains the same.
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Figure 4: Advantage of YeomAI attack for each ML method, for different amount of DP noise applied at Stage 1, 2, or 3, for
different synthetic dataset complexities. The underlying complexity of data vectors in each dataset remains the same.
4.2 Privacy-Utility Tradeoff on Real Data
Here, we present an analysis of results on real data, highlighting
pattern similarities and differences compared to the synthetic data.
4.2.1 ML accuracy vs. DP noise. Next, we analyze the ACL on real
data in a similar fashion as with the synthetic data, but grouping
results of all datasets by class complexity (number of classes) to
facilitate comparison. We discuss model performance at each stage
and across stages, and the impact of class complexity on ACL.
Stage 1 (S1):When the DP noise is applied in S1, i.e., directly on
the dataset, in Figures 5(a-b), we observe similar trends with ACL
in synthetic data. However, ACL remains high until ϵ increases to
∼100. Up to that point, the modeling process is unable to learn the
dataset rules, and the ACL is indicative of random guesses from
the model, and this is true regardless of the model used. When the
smallest amount of DP noise (i.e., ϵ=1000) is applied, we find that
NB performs the best and achieves the lowest ACL (0.2<ACL <0.4)
between the two ML methods. On the other hand, NN performs
the worst at this degree of DP noise, since its ACL is high (0.4<ACL
<0.7), regardless of dataset complexity.
Stage 2 (S2): Interestingly, as seen in Figure 5(c), when the DP
noise is applied at S2, i.e., during model training, we notice that
ACL is at its highest at ϵ≈10 for NN . In particular, we observe that
the accuracy is generally low, and also highly dependent on the
dataset used (0.1<ACL <0.9).
Stage 3 (S3): When the DP noise is applied at S3, i.e., after the
model was trained but before it is used, we see (Figure 5(d)) the
ACL at its highest until ϵ≈0.1 for NB. When this inflection point is
passed, and DP is applied, the lowest ACL ≈0 is achieved, and this
performance is consistent across all datasets and class complexities.
Remark 2. We observe that ACL drops below 0.0 in S3: NB, indi-
cating a model accuracy higher than if no privacy was applied. It is
likely that the small amounts of DP noise applied have assisted in
generalizing the model to predict better on unseen data. However, as
the DP noise continues to increase, a diminished model performance
returns. These may be interesting cases where a practitioner can seek
to obtain smaller ϵ at no cost to model performance.
Dataset class complexity: Generally, we know that datasets with
high class complexity are harder to model with ML methods, and
thus, their accuracy achieved would be expected to be low, even
in presence of no DP noise. Indeed, in the above experimentation,
we notice that in several occasions, datasets with 50 or 100 classes
are difficult to model with high accuracy and high DP noise. When
small amount of DP noise is applied on low-complexity datasets
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with 2, 10 or even 20 classes, and especially in S1 and S3, the tested
ML methods perform fairly well, with low ACL.
Comparing ML Performance Across DP-ML framework
Stages: To offer stronger protection guarantees for the given data,
moreDP noise must be added on the data (i.e., move towards the left
hand-side of the aforementioned plots). When adding more noise,
it appears that the ACL is affected in a similar fashion, for any ML
method used, and regardless of the Stage at which we apply the
noise, or dataset class complexity. There is an amount of DP noise
that when it is added, it obscures much of the data variability, and
consequently increases theACL of each trainedmodel. Interestingly,
as identified earlier at the analysis of results from each Stage, and
even on the results with synthetic data, this inflection point moves
to higher levels of DP noise (i.e., lower values of ϵ), as the noise
is added in later Stages in the framework. In particular, we notice
that the ACL is drastically reduced when:
Stage 1: Inflection point of ϵ > 100
Stage 2: Inflection point of ϵ > 1
Stage 3: Inflection point of ϵ > 0.1
Furthermore, it appears that the various models perform differ-
ently depending on the Stage the DP noise is applied. NB is more
effective when used at S3 than S1, for the same amount of DP noise,
the model accuracy is better (i.e., ACL is lower). However, if the
DP-enabled ML framework requires consistent ML performance
(i.e., low ACL) across datasets of different class complexities (i.e.,
2-100 classes), then DP noise may need to be applied at S1. NN
performs better across all datasets when low noise is applied at S1.
4.2.2 Membership Inference Attacks vs. DP noise. Next, we analyze
the advantage of an attacker when mounting the SalemMI attack,
in a similar fashion as with the synthetic data, but grouping results
of all real datasets by class complexity. We discuss the effectiveness
of SalemMI attack on individual models per stage and across stages,
and the impact of class complexity on the attack.
Stage 1 (S1): When DP is applied at S1, we notice that SalemMI
advantage is generally low and close to zero, up to ϵ≈100 for NB
in Figure 6(a). NN shows a non-zero advantage from ϵ≈10 and on.
Moving from left to right in the ϵ-axis, and until these thresholds are
reached, the SalemMI attacker does not gain any privacy advantage
from discerning if data records were being included in the training
dataset of the given model or not.
Stage 2 (S2):When DP noise is applied at S2, the SalemMI advan-
tage is low for any ϵ for NN , in Figure 6(c), with the effectiveness
of this attack on NN built with DP noise added at this Stage is low.
Specifically, we observe that for the NN , the attacker’s advantage
is overall low (SalemMI <0.008), regardless of the amount of DP
noise applied.
Stage 3 (S3): When DP is applied at S3, SalemMI advantage in-
creases when ϵ>1 for NB in Figure 6(d). This means that when NB
is trained, datasets with high class complexity are more vulnerable.
This has been previously stipulated as a result of overfitting to each
specific class, given that the feature space is to be divided up into
more decision regions.
Interestingly, all aforementioned results demonstrate similar
patterns with the results on synthetic data (i.e., Fig. 3 and 6).
Comparing SalemMI AcrossDP-ML framework Stages:As ex-
pected, when adding less DP noise in the framework (depending
on the Stage at which it is applied), this impacts the effectiveness of
a SalemMI attacker. In particular, when the inflection points below
are reached, the attacker has a non-zero advantage.
Stage 1: Inflection point of ϵ>10∼500
Stage 2: Inflection point of ϵ>0.5
Stage 3: Inflection point of ϵ>1
Additionally, for the same amount of DP noise, different ML
methods allow the attacker to learn different amounts of private in-
formation (i.e., which instances of data are members of the training
set). For example, NB allows the attacker to learn up to 10x more
when the DP is applied in S3 than in S1, in addition to the inflection
point to be found in lower ϵ values for S3 than for S1. Finally, when
DP is applied in S2:NN , there is 10x less privacy leakage than S1:NN .
4.2.3 Attribute Inference Attacks vs. DP noise. Next, we analyze the
results of YeomAI attack on real data, in a similar fashion as with
the synthetic data, but again, grouping results of all real datasets by
class. Again, we discuss the attack’s effectiveness on each stage and
across stages, and how class complexity is an influencing factor.
Stage 1 (S1): From Figures 7(a-b), we observe that for many of the
models, and for the different datasets and class complexities, the
YeomAI advantage is very low and even negative, which points to
failed attack for leaking private information on the attributes of
member data vectors in comparison to non-members. A negative
advantage indicates that the attacker can achieve greater attack
success when a vector has been excluded from the training dataset
than when kept within. Therefore, this attack is not very effective
when executed on a DP-enabled ML framework that has trained
models while injecting DP noise at S1, i.e., before any ML training.
Between of the two models trained, NN would potentially leak
the most, when the DP noise is low (ϵ>100). Interestingly, the
adversary’s advantage would still be 6x lower than in SalemMI ,
though AI is the more difficult attack.
Stage 2 (S2):When DP noise is added at S2, from Figure 7(c), we
observe an equally low advantage, however the attacker achieves
negative advantage (Negative advantage may not necessarily be dis-
advantageous, as there is still sufficient information to distinguish
between members and non-members.).
Stage 3 (S3): Similarly with S2, in S3, a YeomAI attacker can leak
information about attributes of the data, when NB is trained, and
above an inflection point of ϵ>5 (Figure 7(d)). This advantage is 8x
lower than SalemMI .
Comparing YeomAI Across DP-ML framework Stages: Exam-
ining this attack across Stages, for differentMLmethods, we observe
the following. NB allows the attacker a superior ability to leak more
private information when DP noise is applied in S3. In fact, if DP is
applied at S3, the attacker will make 3x more errors (false positives)
than S1, while trying to infer values of attributes. Finally, NN is
more robust against AI attacks when DP noise is applied at S2, in
comparison to S1 which allows some information on attributes to
leak at low amounts of DP noise. Again, we notice a clear shift of
the inflection point to lower levels of ϵ as previously seen in the
MI attacks:
Stage 1: Inflection point of ϵ>100
Stage 2: Inflection point of ϵ>50
Stage 3: Inflection point of ϵ>5
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Figure 5: Accuracy Loss for each of the ML methods used, when different amount of DP noise is applied at Stage 1, 2 or 3 of
the framework, and for different real datasets used. We summarize the datasets by the number of classes used.
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(b) S1: Neural Network
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Figure 6: Advantage of SalemMI attack for each ML method used, when different amount of DP noise is applied at Stage 1, 2
or 3 of the ML framework, and for different datasets used. We summarize the datasets by number of classes used.
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Figure 7: Advantage of YeomAI attack for each ML method used, when different amount of DP noise is applied at S1, S2, and
S3 of the framework, and for different datasets used. We summarize the datasets by number of classes used.
Comparing MI and AI attacks: In general, we observe that AI
attacks are less successful in leaking information about the data
than MI attacks. This is based on the advantages computed in the
SalemMI attack that are mostly positive and of higher values than
the YeomAI attack values achieved, which were mostly zero or nega-
tive. This is to be expected, since an AI attack is an objectively more
demanding attack with more potential for producing an incorrect
result with the need to predict the exact value, instead of a binary
membership/non-membership decision. It is also more difficult to
be carried out in practice, due to the prerequisite knowledge the
attacker should have of all but 1 attribute values.
4.2.4 DP-based ML under Constrained ACL or ϵ . An ML practi-
tioner may wish to apply the most effective ML approach while
considering constraints for either the ACL or ϵ .
ACL-bounded recommendations:We now determine which DP-
based ML algorithm offers the best privacy guarantees (ϵ), when a
practitioner’s accuracy requirements are constrained. Specifically,
we consider when the ACL cannot exceed a pre-determined thresh-
old. To find the corresponding privacy offered (ϵ) and the associated
ML technique, we linearly interpolate the empirical trend of ACL
and ϵ . Then, we find the value of ϵ closest to the bounded ACL,
for all ML methods tested. Finally, we report the lowest ϵ , and the
corresponding ML method.
We display results for ACL constraints in Table 3. We observe
that NB with DP noise applied in S3 is a prevalent option that can
offer good accuracy for datasets with various class complexities.
Only NN in S1 is a viable option for a binary class dataset, when
the ACL requirement is very low (e.g., 0.01).
ϵ-bounded recommendations: We now determine which DP-
based ML algorithm offers the least accuracy loss, when a practi-
tioner’s privacy guarantee has been mandated. We use a similar
interpolation technique. The results in Table 4 show that NN with
DP noise applied in S1 are better options when high privacy con-
straints are required.
However, they lead to high ACL, which renders the models use-
less. When the privacy requirement can be relaxed, and the noise
is applied in S2 or S3, then NB is a better option for maintaining
ML accuracy, this remains true for datasets with low or high class
complexity.
4.2.5 Summary of Findings. In Figure 8, we summarize the findings
from different experimental setups, for ACL and for the two pri-
vacy attacks of SalemMI and YeomAI .In these summary figures, the
tradeoff between ACL and protection against privacy leaks emerges
more clearly. From this figure, and based on all previous explo-
rations with respect to ACL and the two privacy attacks (SalemMI ,
and YeomAI ), we summarize our key takeaways:
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Figure 8: Summary plot of ACL (y1-axis) and Privacy advantage (y2-axis) vs. ϵ applied (x-axis), for each Stage. Each point, for
a line of a given Stage, is the mean across all results for different ML methods and datasets. Shaded colored areas signify 1 st.
dev. around each mean.
Table 3: Given a constrained ACL, we show best attainable
privacy guarantee (ϵ), and the responsibleDP-ML algorithm.
2 Classes 10 Classes 20 Classes 50 Classes 100 Classes
ACL ϵ DP-ML ϵ DP-ML ϵ DP-ML ϵ DP-ML ϵ DP-ML
0.01 50.00 S1-NN 16.52 S3-NB 38.11 S3-NB 31.71 S3-NB 30.17 S3-NB
0.02 47.23 S3-NB 14.18 S3-NB 35.99 S3-NB 30.01 S3-NB 28.61 S3-NB
0.05 37.62 S3-NB 9.47 S3-NB 29.61 S3-NB 24.89 S3-NB 23.92 S3-NB
0.10 21.61 S3-NB 7.31 S3-NB 18.99 S3-NB 16.37 S3-NB 16.10 S3-NB
0.20 7.70 S3-NB 4.52 S3-NB 8.16 S3-NB 8.32 S3-NB 8.52 S3-NB
0.30 1.14 S3-NB 3.48 S3-NB 4.99 S3-NB 5.64 S3-NB 6.08 S3-NB
Table 4: Given a constrained ϵ , we show the smallest com-
promise in ACL, and the responsible DP-ML algorithm.
2 Classes 10 Classes 20 Classes 50 Classes 100 Classes
ϵ ACL DP-ML ACL DP-ML ACL DP-ML ACL DP-ML ACL DP-ML
0.01 0.321 S1-NN 0.804 S1-NN 0.863 S1-NN 0.950 S1-NN 0.958 S1-NN
0.10 0.321 S1-NN 0.802 S1-NN 0.858 S3-NB 0.949 S1-NN 0.952 S3-NB
1.0 0.301 S2-NB 0.540 S3-NB 0.634 S3-NB 0.717 S3-NB 0.727 S3-NB
10 0.136 S3-NB 0.038 S3-NB 0.142 S3-NB 0.137 S3-NB 0.139 S3-NB
100 0.001 S3-NB -0.141 S3-NB -0.055 S3-NB -0.124 S3-NB -0.135 S3-NB
1000 -0.001 S3-NB -0.127 S3-NB -0.042 S3-NB -0.109 S3-NB -0.121 S3-NB
(1) For a given amount of DP noise applied, ML models predict
better (i.e., have good accuracy and lowACL), when the noise
is inserted at a later Stage (e.g., S2 or S3 than S1) [Sec. 4.2.1].
(2) To achieve reduced privacy leaks (lower attack advantages
are better) with least amount of DP noise, this must be added
in earlier Stages in the framework (S1 > S2 > S3) [Sec. 4.2.2
& 4.2.3]. Unfortunately, this comes with a penalty of worse
ML prediction (accuracy) [Sec. 4.2.1]. Consequently:
(3) The performance of current state-of-art MI and AI
attacks is directly related to the prediction accuracy of the
DP-ML model used. The inflection points of ACL and privacy
advantage for each DP-ML method correspond to approxi-
mately the same amount of DP noise.
(4) The amount of DP noise added to a given DP-ML
method does not influence the inflection point of a privacy
attack (both MI and AI); instead, the inflection of attack suc-
cess is dependent on the DP-MLmethod used and framework
Stage the noise is applied (as noted in Takeaway 2).
(5) The data complexity is unlikely to affect the inflection point
of ACL [Sec. 4.2.1], or attack advantage [Sec. 4.2.2 and 4.2.3].
The inflection observed for each complexity is similar, for
a given DP-ML method. We do, however, corroborate the
known result that higher class complexity (more classes)
lead to higher privacy leaks [31, 32].
(6) When investigating the tradeoff over a wide range of ACL
and ϵ constraints, we observe that S3:NB is the superior
performing DP-ML method.
(7) Evaluating the privacy-utility tradeoffwith synthetic [Sec. 4.1]
and real-world data [Sec. 4.2] yields similarities in trends and
takeaways. There is potential for a dataset-agnostic approach
to estimate inflection points for similarly classed data.
5 DISCUSSION
We presented a comprehensive empirical study on the inherent
tradeoff between utility and privacy when applying DP on ML al-
gorithms. We investigated four, state of art DP-enabled ML and
DL algorithms currently available in literature, and evaluated the
aforementioned tradeoff in each ML method, using two privacy
inference attacks and one utility metric. We performed this inves-
tigation using both synthetic datasets and three commonly used
real datasets of varying class and attribute complexity. Finally, we
extracted from this experimentation various lessons, and offered
recommendations to interested privacy ML researchers.
During this evaluation with our framework, we limited the num-
ber of experimental configurations, to make the problem tractable
with comparable results. Next, we discuss experimental variants
that can be investigated in the future with our framework.
DP variants: In this study, we considered only ϵ-DP . However,
as already mentioned in Section 2.2, there is an increasing number
of DP compositions and relaxations, such as (ϵ,δ )-DP and (α , ϵ)-DP .
Interestingly, these DP relaxations are relatively recent, and many
of the DP-enabled ML algorithms available in literature that we
used, are still using the original ϵ-DP . Future work should address
how to adapt such algorithms to support newer DP relaxations,
but should also enable ML practitioners to fairly compare these
methods. For this, one would need to establish an equivalence
between the various DP options available. In fact, in the future,
even a simple evaluation of how a varying δ in (ϵ,δ )-DP impacts
the resulting ACL and privacy metrics would be highly informative.
Local vs. Global DP: The boundary of trusted and non-trusted
entities is becoming increasingly blurred. On one hand, ML model
holders seek to protect their models’ privacy and user data. On
the other, privacy advocates argue even the model holders should
not be a trusted entity. In fact, there is a notion of trust in the DP
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ML pipeline: Local DP is when DP is applied very close to data
generation without considering information or context about the
entire system. Instead, Global DP does not need to tradeoff as much
utility for same mathematical guarantees: with global system view,
it can make more intelligent decisions on how to apply DP noise.
In our framework, Local DP loosely corresponds to inserting DP
noise in S1, with ML training receiving DP-protected data, whereas
Global DP corresponds to DP noise applied in S2 or S3, with the
model having unfettered access to unprotected data.
Utility metrics:We focused on accuracy (loss) of a DP-enabled
ML model with respect to its non-private counterpart. However, as
mentioned in Section 2.6, more metrics can be employed to assess
the change in utility of a trained DP-enabled ML model, such as
precision, recall, F1 measure, etc. Furthermore, model Fairness [8]
is another metric of particular interest given the increased public
scrutiny of ML model fairness in the context of well established
anti-discriminatory legal frameworks across the globe.
Computation Cost: Another potential aspect of the privacy-
utility tradeoff to be studied is the resource overhead and its relation
to the amount of DP noise, and the framework Stage it is added.
6 FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have laid the groundwork for systematically eval-
uating Differentially-Private (DP) machine learning techniques.
The next steps will be to include in our study additional learning
methods such as DP-Logistic Regression [18, 36] and DP-Random
Forests [13]. In additional to new algorithms, newly proposed ap-
proaches to existing methods, for example adaptive weight clipping
in stochastic gradient decent (NN ) [28], can improve utility whilst
preserving the DP guarantees. Additionally, in the current land-
scape of Inference attacks, researchers continue to increase the
effectiveness of said attacks, with alternate MI attacks, like the one
of Shokri’s [32] or Yeom’s MI attack [35], or new AI attacks [37].
From our current investigation, we were able to demonstrate a clear
inflection point of the tradeoff between Utility and Privacy, in rela-
tion to the amount of privacy added (with DP-noise). Of particular
interest, is the ability to predict this behavior either through an
expanded set of generic benchmarks, or through modeling the rela-
tionship between the data, privacy, and utility of the ML pipeline.
7 CONCLUSION
Privacy-preserving machine learning (ML) methods come with
the inherent tradeoff between model utility achieved and privacy
offered by the technique applied to protect the data. Our main
contribution with this paper is the proposal of a practical evalua-
tion framework that enables a privacy ML researcher to study this
tradeoff in depth for their data, and make data-driven decisions on
where to apply Differentially Private (DP) noise inside their ML
framework to protect their data and model, while achieving the
best possible ML accuracy.
We identify three such Stages in the DP-enabled ML framework
whereDP-based noise can be added: 1) directly at the data collection,
2) during model training, or 3) at model finalization. We allow the
practitioner to apply different amounts of noise based on the privacy
guarantees they have, and at the different stages in the framework,
and study the aforementioned tradeoff between utility of the model
trained, and the privacy of the data or model achieved, using four
well-known privacy attacks.
We use our framework to comprehensively evaluate various
implementations of DP-based ML algorithms, and measure their
ability to fend off real-world privacy attacks, in addition to mea-
suring their core goal of providing accurate classifications. We
evaluate each implementation across a range of privacy budgets,
and datasets, each implementation providing the same mathemat-
ical privacy guarantees. By measuring the models’ resistance to
real world attacks of membership and attribute inference, and their
classification accuracy, we determine which methods provide the
most desirable tradeoff between privacy and utility. Building on our
results, we provide recommendations to a privacy ML researcher
on how to select appropriate, DP-based ML methods, based on the
data complexity at hand, and privacy guarantees and utility needs.
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